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Abstract—We propose a simple market scenario with fill-
or-kill, block and minimum income orders to test the effect
of various clearing mechanisms in a computationally easy-to-
handle environment. We consider two classical clearing-price
based approaches as reference, which differ in the acceptance
rules of block bids, and a novel clearing method, where we
decouple demand and supply side prices. We show that if we
apply price decoupling for, the total social welfare may be
significantly increased.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity markets are special from several points of view.
First of all since, even today, electricity cannot be efficiently
and economically stored, the generation must meet the con-
sumption at every instance. Second, since transmission lines
do have limited capacity, and the flows in the complex
interconnected system of transmission lines are determined
by the Kirchoff laws, inlets and outlets must be carefully
designed to minimize losses and meet transmission constraints.
In power engineering literature the fundamental problem of
this topic corresponds to optimal power flow (for surveys
see [1]–[3]). Regarding electricity markets, the transmission
constraint phenomena is taken into account in market coupling
problems [4], [5].
An other aspect, which makes electricity trading difficult
is the inertia of generators and plants. On the one hand, the
demand for electricity changes rapidly, thus it is desirable
to make trading available on the level of hours or even
tens of minutes. On the other hand, because of technological
constraints it may be for example impossible for a generating
unit to sell a significant amount at hour 1, then stand still
for hour 2 and then trade in hour 3 again, even if the market
clearing prices would imply this. In addition the cost profile
of a generating unit may usually be described with a fix and a
variable cost component, making the pricing of bids not trivial.
The first approach for these problem is the concept of block
orders [6], which, exactly for this reason incorporate multiple
trading periods, and must be accepted in all or none of them.
If a plant is bidding in the electricity market, it may include its
fixed cost component in the price of the block orders as well
to cover all the expenses of generation. If bids on the market
may be also partially accepted, modern methods allow very
efficient market clearing [7], however fill-or-kill type bids and
block orders always make the picture more complicated [8].
The aspects of truthful bidding and collusion-proofness are
also an important questions in the design of electricity market
mechanisms [9].
Generation costs of a generating block may be classified
into two categories, constant and variable costs. Constant
costs are usually related to the general process of running
the plant, while variable costs reflect those expenses which
depend upon the actual amount of electrical energy produced
(eg. fuel costs). Variable costs are accounted for usually as a
linear function of the actual produced quantity. The so called
minimum income condition (MIC) has been recently proposed
as an approach for the description of fixed and variable
cost components [10], [11]. In these approaches, plants may
submit data about their fixed and variable cost components in
addition to conventional orders to ensure a minimal economic
dispatch for themselves. However as the concept of MIC is
quite novel, market analyses and efficient clearing algorithms
corresponding to this concept are not prevalent in literature.
In this article we compare the conventional reference price-
based clearing methods to a novel proposal. In the proposed
scenario, we suppose that the market clearing prices for the
demand and supply side are decoupled. This means that for
each hour we suppose a demand price and a supply price. In
this case in addition to conventional constraints (demand and
supply amounts must match), we need to have an additional
cost balance constraint. Namely the total income, determined
by the hourly demand prices, must at least cover the total sum
of expenses, composed by the cost of accepted supply orders
and the cost of generation, corresponding to minimum income
conditions.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
We propose a simple framework of a small day-ahead
market model with only two consecutive hours, which is on
the one hand simple enough to evaluate even with exhaustive
search methods in the case of conventional clearing, thus
avoid the problems of computational limitations potentially
corresponding to clearing methods for large scale problems.
On the other hand we consider only fill-or-kill offers on hour
and two hour level (both on the demand and supply side).
We call these fill-or-kill one hour supply or demand orders
standard orders in the following, while we call the two-hour
fill-or-kill bids block orders. Furthermore we consider block
orders both at demand and supply side.
In addition to block orders we consider MIC bids, which
are tailored to plants. In these bids the plant provides its fixed
cost, which it requires in every case in which the plant is
operating and its variable cost corresponding to the exact value
of production. However, in the current setting we suppose
that basically if plant submits such a MIC bid, it will not
be considered together in addition to its other bids, but as
a standalone offer. In other words, every plant must choose
between the submission of conventional bids and possibly
block bids or an MIC bid. On the other hand, let us remark
that the submitted fixed and variable cost are not necessary
equal to the real fixed and variable costs, they also may hold
some margin, and are subject to bidding strategies in general.
In addition for such orders, plants are also required to provide
their minimal and maximal production value. Since apart from
MIC bids, all orders do have the fill or kill property, MIC
bids are the only one with amount flexibility, thus are key
components of this market model.
For the aim of simplicity, load gradient constraints are not
considered in this study. We begin with summing up the
numbers of various offers for the simple market model and
continue with the various clearing methods.
A. Bids
We consider the following bids in the simple market model
• 17 standard demand bids for hour 1, ranging from 25 to
80 MWs regarding amounts and 6 to 12 regarding price
(e.g. EUR/MW), with a mean of 9.02.
• 16 standard demand bids for hour 2, ranging from 25 to
75 MWs regarding amounts and 7 to 13 regarding price,
with a mean of 9.43.
• 3 block demand bids, ranging from 35 to 60 MWs
regarding hourly amounts and 7.7 to 9.2 regarding price
(we assume that block orders mat have different price
requirements for each hour), with a mean of 8.5.
• 8 standard supply bids for hour 1, ranging from 10 to 30
MWs regarding amounts and 7.3 to 11 regarding price,
with a mean of 8.96.
• 8 standard supply bids for hour 2, ranging from 5 to 25
MWs regarding amounts and 8.1 to 11.9 regarding price,
with a mean of 9.78.
• 2 block supply bids, of 20 to 40 MWs and 8.3 to 9.2
regarding price (we assume that block orders mat have
different price requirements for each hour), with a mean
of 8.6333.
• 3 MIC bids, with fixed costs 600, 1000 and 300, variable
costs 7.1 6.8 and 7.5, minimal production 100 250 50,
and maximal production 250 400 150.
B. Conventional clearing mechanisms
In this subsection we present two possible clearing mecha-
nisms for the simple market model based on [11]. Both of the
proposed clearing mechanisms are price-focussed with global
prices, which means that the set of accepted and declined
offers is determined based solely on the market clearing prices
(for hour 1 and 2), which are uniform for demand and supply
side. The clearing prices allow the usage of the concept of
social welfare (SW). The SW corresponding to an accepted
demand bid in hour 1 may be computed as qdb(pdb − p
1
mc),
where qdb and pdb are the amount of the demand bid and the
price of the demand bid respectively, and p1mc is the market
clearing price in hour 1. Naturally we assume that a standard
demand (supply) bid is accepted only, if the market clearing
price of the corresponding hour is less (more) than the price
of the bid. If a block bid is accepted its SW values may be
computed hour-wise.
The two mechanisms differ basically in the handling of
block bids:
• The first mechanism (C1) allows the acceptance of block
bids only if the market clearing prices are appropriate in
both of the periods. In the case of e.g. the demand bids,
this means that the market clearing price must not exceed
the bid price in either of the hours.
• The second mechanism (C2) allows the acceptance of
block bids in the case when the total resulting SW of the
bid is positive. This means that on the hour-level, a block
bid may have negative SW in one period, if the positive
SW component in the other hour is greater.
Both of the mechanisms include the following steps
1) Given the price vector, holding the market clearing
prices in hour 1 and 2, the set of accepted standard and
block bids are determined regarding both demand and
supply side.
2) Given the set of accepted bids, the total required and
supplied amount of power is calculated. If the supplied
amount exceeds the required amount for any hour, the
price vector is considered as infeasible.
3) If the difference of the required and supplied power
amount is positive for every hour, a dispatch is calculated
for all the MIC offers.
4) Regarding the dispatch method we consider the follow-
ing calculation. The dispatch is calculated for all the
feasible operation profiles. Under the expression opera-
tion profile we mean the set of plants in operation. Since
in this small example we have only three plants (corre-
sponding to the three MIC bids), this is computationally
not demanding in this case. The dispatch algorithm cal-
culates the production values which require the least to-
tal cost from the plants. This dispatch algorithm may be
considered as a very simple unit commitment problem.
Thus means the solution of a simple linear programming
(LP) problem in this case, where the constraints originate
from one hand the required power amounts, and on
the other hand from the economic considerations which
describe that given the market clearing prices for each
hour and cost components, every single plant must have
at least the income to cover its production cost. Fixed
cost components are determined by the operation profile,
while variable cost components are determined by the
actual dispached production values (nonzero only in the
case of operating plants). Once the production values
and total cost of the generators are given, one may
calculate their SW by determining the income of the
generator j by ∑
i
pimcg
i
j
where gij is the production output of generator j in
time period i ∈ {1, 2}. The SW of a generator is
then computed as the difference between its income and
costs.
We have to note that it is not common to have an embedded
unit commitment problem in the dispatching mechanism,
however in the case of the supposed bid structures it is
straightforward to use such an approach for the dispatching
of the MIC bids. Regarding the efficient solution of unit
commitment problems one may refer to [12].
C. Price decoupling clearing
In the case of the proposed price-decoupling clearing (PD),
the algorithm is very similar to the previous ones, the only
significant difference is that we assume distinct demand and
supply prices for each hour – in the case of the proposed small
example this means that we have not 2 but 4 variables. The
acceptance of demand bids do depend on the hourly demand
prices, while the acceptance of supply bids do depend on the
hourly supply prices. Block orders are cleared as in C2. In the
case of this clearing method only those price combinations are
considered feasible, which result in an income amount from
demand bids at least equal to the costs of supply bids and
generation costs. We denote the market clearing demand and
supply prices with pdimc and p
si
mc respectively.
As the clearing mechanisms described in subsection II-B
use only two variables for the two hours, it is easy to compute
the SW and all corresponding values (e.g. generation) for all
possible price combinations. Determining the prices which
imply the maximum total SW is trivial in these cases. In
contrast, since the in the PD clearing method the number
of variables is already four, which results in a large number
of possible combinations, we apply a numerical approach to
find the maximal total SW. In this experimental setting we
handled the scenario as a general global optimization problem,
where in the case of infeasible setups the SW is considered to
be equal to 0. Setups are considered infeasible if the supply
amount from bids exceeds the demand amount from bids or
when the demands are such that the generators can not be
dispatched – eg. 25 MW in any hour, which is below the
minimal production level of any generator) Such a formulation
is very unlucky in the case of large scale problems, for on one
hand the integer properties are not explicitly formulated, and
on the other hand the convergence properties are expected to
be very bad, but as we will see, even this dummy approach
will do the job in our case. For the numerical optimization the
particle swarm optimization [13] through the toolbox OPTI
[14] of MATLAB was used.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First, we may depict the total SW in the case of C1 and
C2, in Figs 1 and 2. In infeasible regions we suppose that the
SW is equal to 0.
Fig. 1. Total SW, assuming clearing mechanism C1.
Fig. 2. Total SW, assuming clearing mechanism C2.
Fe may see that the feasible region is somewhat larger in
the case of C2, however the feasible region of C1 is not a
subset of the feasible region corresponding to C2. C1 and
C2 differs in the acceptance of block bids, more precisely
according to C2, block bids are more likely to be accepted.
It is possible however that the acceptance of a certain block
bid implies a small difference between demand and supplied
power, thus results in an infeasible scenario regarding the
unit commitment problem (power demand is below minimum
production values).
The maximal total SW (the sum of SW by demand and
supply bids and generation), is 2098 in the case of the cleari
method C1 and 2125 in the case of the clearing method C2.
The market clearing prices are p1mc = 8.2, p
2
mc = 8.8, and
p1mc = 8.5, p
2
mc = 9 in the cases of the clearing method C1
and C2 respectively. The generation values are(
0 378 150
0 358 150
)
in the case of C1 (rows correspond to hours, columns corre-
spond to plants), and (
0 385 0
0 383 0
)
in the case of C2. As we se the different consideration of
block bids significantly affects the parameters of the optimum,
regarding the market clearing prices and generated amounts as
well.
In the case of the clearing method PD, as the problem
includes already 4 variables and, as mentioned earlier, we ob-
tained the maximal SW by optimization. We get the following
market clearing prices.
pd1mc = 7.94 p
d2
mc = 9.39 p
s1
mc = 13 p
s2
mc = 7.47
We can see that in hour 1 the price of the supply side exceeds
the demand side, wile in hour 2, the tendency is the opposite.
These prices result in an income of 9177 from demand bids,
a cost of 3036 of supply bids and a generation cost of 6141,
induced by the generation values(
0 383 0
0 373 0
)
In this case we get a social welfare of 4129.
Table I sums up the results regarding social welfare.
clearing method C1 C2 PD
maximal SW 2098 2125 4129
TABLE I
TOTAL SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE CASE OF VARIOUS CLEARING METHODS
Regarding the results described in Table I, we may observe
the following. The fact that we get the highest SW value in the
case of PD is not surprising, since C2 may be considered as
a special case of PD, where the demand prices are equal to
the supply prices. In other words the PD approach allows
significantly more feasible setups. However, the difference
between the conventional and the PD approach is remarkable,
the total social welfare generated by the decoupling approach
is almost twice as much as in the case of C1 or C2.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the classical case, where partial acceptance of standard
demand and supply bids is possible, and no block orders are
present, the decoupling of demand and supply prices makes
no sense, since the cost balance implies that one may only
increase the demand price or lower the supply price, both
resulting in lower social welfare compared to the classic curve-
intersection based equilibrium point. As the proposed model
shows, this is definitely not the case if the bid set is com-
posed of fill-or-kill orders, block orders or minimum income
condition bids. In general it is very important to study market
mechanisms with these type of bids, since they originate from
technological characteristics of power plants thus are more
able to represent the physical aspects of electricity production
in the market mechanism.
As we have shown in this simple example, the decoupling
of demand and supply prices may have significant economical
and conceptual consequences, but as the illustrated case shows,
the benefits regarding social welfare may be very remarkable.
According to the presented initial results, it is plausible to
assume that this increase in the total social welfare correlates
with the ratio of block and MIC bids in the analyzed marked.
A. Future work
Regarding the small market model with the described bids,
one possible application of the proposed framework is exactly
to test variable optimization based clearing solutions and more
heuristics in a small scale environment, where several aspects
of the examples can be efficiently visualized to enhance deeper
understanding of the underlying processes and phenomena. In
addition the described scenario shall serve also as a benchmark
to test experimental market rules and analyze their effect
on the SW profile and solvability properties of the market
problem. As the proposed clearing methods rely on the unit
commitment subproblem, it would be clearly desirable (if not
unavoidable) to explicitly include the unit commitment in the
clearing mechanism which determines the prices of the market.
Furthermore the proposed framework can be considered also
as playground for agent based models, and serve as a tool for
market power analysis. One may examine for example, that in
a given environment which is more favorable for a plant: To
submit conventional block bids, or the submission of minimal
income orders.
Regarding the price decoupling based clearing method,
the next straightforward task is the mixed integer problem
formulation of the method in the case of the proposed offer
structure, to get a description formalism for which the clearing
may be efficiently computed for large scale systems in a
reasonable time frame.
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